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FOURTEEN REASONS PRIVACY MATTERS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
REVIEW OF SCHOLARLY LITERATURE1
Trina J. Magi2
Librarians have long recognized the importance of privacy to intellectual freedom.
As digital technology and its applications advance, however, efforts to protect privacy
may become increasingly difficult. With some users behaving in ways that suggest
they do not care about privacy and with powerful voices claiming that privacy is
dead, librarians may question whether privacy is worth protecting. This article
reviews some of the extensive scholarly literature on privacy from disciplines outside
the field of library science, including anthropology, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology, and it identifies fourteen reasons privacy matters
to individuals, relationships, and to society. It also discusses the challenge of defining
privacy and addresses the question of how the concept of privacy spans cultures.
Librarians may find this broader understanding of the value of privacy useful in
affirming and defending their commitment to the privacy of library users.

Introduction and Background
At least since the adoption of the American Library Association’s (ALA)
first Code of Ethics in 1939, librarians have acknowledged that the right to
privacy is necessary for intellectual freedom [1]. Privacy enables library
users to pursue any topic or question of interest and to read and view
information without fearing judgment, surveillance, punishment, or ostracism. Librarians have protected this right in small, quiet ways in their dayto-day work, and from time to time, they also have worked to protect it in
more public ways, by opposing the Library Awareness Program and the
USA PATRIOT Act, for example [2].
Librarians have said that privacy and the freedom to read are critical
1. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of Alison Armstrong.
2. Bailey/Howe Library, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405; E-mail trina.magi@uvm.edu.
[Library Quarterly, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 187–209]
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for the success of democratic government, in which people are to be their
own informed governors. They have warned people about the chilling
effect and self-censorship that may occur if library users feel they are being
watched and placed under suspicion based on what they read. This is
certainly an important concern, and perhaps it should be enough to motivate librarians to adhere to the profession’s Code of Ethics. As digital technology and its applications advance and proliferate, however, efforts to
protect privacy become increasingly difficult. In addition, while there is
evidence that people, including young people, care about privacy [3–5],
they sometimes behave in ways that suggest otherwise [6–9], and powerful
voices from the corporate world are proclaiming that privacy is dead [10].
In light of these factors, some librarians may question whether the right
to privacy is worth the trouble it takes to protect it. If librarians are to
remain among society’s guardians of privacy, it will be valuable to have a
broader and deeper understanding of what is at stake—of the many and
varied ways in which privacy contributes to the well-being of both individuals and society.

Scope
This article attempts to expand librarians’ understanding by reviewing
scholarly literature on privacy from a wide variety of disciplines outside
the field of library science, including anthropology, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology. (The appendix lists the disciplines
of authors cited.) After discussing the challenges of defining privacy and
addressing the question of whether privacy is a value that spans cultures,
the article traces a number of major themes in the literature, enumerating
a host of individual, interpersonal, and societal goods that are made possible by privacy.
The volume of literature on privacy is immense; a recent search in the
WorldCat database on the descriptor “privacy” yielded titles of more than
15,000 books. The books, book chapters, and articles included in this review
are but a small sampling of the literature, identified by first querying
experts and then following the threads of the scholarly debate published
over time. This review does not claim to be comprehensive or evaluative,
and it naturally struggles with the difficulty of summarizing deep and complex arguments in mere sentences and paragraphs. It is hoped, however,
that readers will find it an interesting introduction to selected scholars and
key arguments about why privacy matters, will be motivated to read some
of the works cited in their entirety, and will be reinvigorated in their
commitment to the ALA Code of Ethics.
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The Problem of Defining “Privacy”
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the concept of privacy
has roots in philosophical discussions including Aristotle’s distinction between the public sphere of political activity and the private sphere of
domestic family life. There is considerable confusion, however, over the
meaning, value, and scope of the concept of “privacy,” and the term has
no single definition [11].
In their germinal article “The Right to Privacy,” an essay often considered
the beginning of the written discussion of the concept of privacy in U.S.
law, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis [12] held that the law recognized
the right to privacy as a special case of the right “to be let alone,” a phrase
they attributed to Judge Cooley. Ferdinand Schoeman says that when they
wrote that article in 1890, there was no explicit legal discussion of the
right to privacy, and until the 1960s, there was no major philosophical
discussion of the value of privacy [13, p. 1]. In his 1960 law review article,
William Prosser considers over 300 privacy cases in the books since the
Warren and Brandeis essay, and he finds not one but four torts—a complex
of distinct and only loosely related kinds of interference of the plaintiffs’
right to be let alone: (1) intrusion upon a person’s seclusion, solitude, or
private affairs, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts, (3) publicity
that places a person in a false light, and (4) appropriation of a person’s
name or likeness for the advantage of another [14, p. 389].
There is considerable debate in the literature about whether privacy is
derived from other rights such as ownership rights or the right not to be
harmed, as stated by Judith Jarvis Thomson [15], or a unique right, as
claimed by Ruth Gavison [16] and Jeffrey Reiman [17]. Mark Alfino and
Randolph Mayes argue that privacy is a fundamental, moral right to which
people are entitled, rather than simply a constitutional or legal right or a
right that can be explicated in terms of other rights such as property, life,
or liberty [18].
Daniel Solove finds Prosser’s synthesis of cases that emerged from the
Warren and Brandeis essay to be far too narrow and inadequate in the
information age, in which new technologies have raised many privacy problems that do not fit into Prosser’s four categories. In his review of the
philosophical and legal discourse on privacy, Solove identifies six general
types of definitions of privacy: (1) the right to be let alone, (2) the ability
to limit access to the self by others, (3) secrecy or concealment of certain
matters, (4) the ability to control information about oneself, (5) the protection of one’s personhood, individuality and dignity, and (6) control
over one’s intimate relationships or aspects of life [19, p. 1092].
Solove is concerned that the lack of clarity about what people mean
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when they say that privacy should be protected makes it difficult to make
policy and resolve court cases because legislators and judges “cannot easily
articulate the privacy harm” [20, p. 480]. He is critical of others’ attempts
to reduce the privacy concept to a single essence, often finding the results
too broad and vague to be useful in addressing concrete issues. Instead,
Solove argues that “privacy is best understood as a family resemblance
concept” [20, p. 485], in which various kinds of privacy disruptions are
different from one another yet share important similarities, much like
members of a family may not share a single common characteristic but
are related to one another through a network of overlapping and crisscrossing similarities. He suggests that the term “privacy” should be used
as a shorthand umbrella term for a related web of issues [21, p. 12].
In describing this web of issues, Solove says that privacy is “the relief
from a range of kinds of social friction” that “enables people to engage
in worthwhile activities in ways that they would otherwise find difficult or
impossible” and “protection from a cluster of related activities that impinge
upon people in related ways” [20, p. 484]. He has identified and organized
these problematic and harmful activities in a taxonomy of four groups with
subgroups: (1) information collection (including surveillance, interrogation), (2) information processing (including aggregation, identification,
insecurity, secondary use, exclusion), (3) information dissemination (including breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, distortion), and (4) invasion (including
intrusion, decisional interference) [20, p. 490].
Solove suggests that his taxonomy allows for the recognition of “structural” privacy problems, or the creation of risk that a person might be
harmed in the future in the same way that environmental harms and
pollution accumulate over time and increase the risk that harm will occur
[20, p. 487]. He explains: “In many instances, privacy is threatened not by
singular egregious acts but by a slow series of relatively minor acts, which
gradually begin to add up” [21, pp. 20–21].

Is Privacy Valued across Cultures?
It is likely that the difficulty in defining privacy stems in part from the fact
that the notion of privacy is culturally relative and contingent on factors
such as economic status and availability of technology [11]. Alan Westin
claims that although particular behaviors vary considerably across cultures,
“needs for individual and group privacy and resulting social norms are
present in virtually every society” [22, p. 13], and he cites a host of anthropological studies documenting the various ways societies achieve privacy. His examples include the following: (1) men of the Tuareg tribes of
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north Africa veil their faces and adjust the veil according to the nature of
various relationships and distance-setting processes; (2) the Javanese living
situation seems to offer no privacy, but people achieve privacy through
psychological devices such as speaking softly, hiding their feelings, and
practicing a lack of candor in speech and behavior; (3) the Papago, who
live ten people to a one-room house, maneuver without touching one
another, while Europeans, who have more space, continually touch each
other; (4) few cultures practice total nudity; and (5) most societies have
rules limiting free entry into a house or rules limiting what a person may
touch or where he or she may go in the house.
Westin also cites studies of animal behavior and social organization that
suggest that humans and animals share basic mechanisms for claiming
privacy. He says “the animal’s struggle to achieve a balance between privacy
and participation provides one of the basic processes of animal life. In this
sense, the quest for privacy is not restricted to man alone, but arises in
the biological and social processes of all life” [22, p. 11]. Barry Schwartz
makes the case that even infants and small children have the privacy impulse. The infant may go to sleep or wriggle away from the grasp of an
adult to withdraw from the “field of stimulation.” Later, he or she learns
that he/she can offer or hold back certain facial expressions and dispositions as a causal agent with the power of voluntary reserve. And when
the infant becomes ambulatory, he or she realizes great control over his/
her audience and delights in “hiding” [23, p. 749].
In his exploration of the basis for human rights concepts such as the
individual self, autonomy, agency, and privacy, Larry Nucci examines a
number of fairly recent studies and finds that “areas of personal choice
and discretion are maintained by individuals across a range of cultures”
and that “the personal is not an invention of Western culture, but a psychological necessity for the establishment of the social self” [24, pp. 372–
73]. He concludes that “the individual construction of a personal domain
of choice and privacy generalizes across cultures, and is not restricted to
persons who live within Western or ‘modern’ societies” [24, p. 376].

Why Privacy Matters
Following are fourteen reasons privacy matters, drawn from a multidisciplinary reading of scholarly literature and organized into three broad sections: (1) benefits to the individual, (2) benefits to personal relationships,
and (3) benefits to society. The reasons identified within each section are
intended to represent unique concepts, but because it is difficult to create
perfectly discrete categories, the reader may find some degree of overlap
among them.
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Benefits to the Individual
1. Privacy protects from overreach of social interactions and provides opportunity
for relaxation and concentration.—In their essay identifying a right to privacy,
Warren and Brandeis were responding in part to the intrusive impact of
“modern devices” such as photography when they wrote that “the intensity
and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world” [12, p. 196]. As Gavison
expresses it, the “concern for the opportunity to have solitude and anonymity is related not only to the wish to conceal some kinds of information,
but also to needs such as relaxation, concentration, and freedom from
inhibition” [16, p. 435]. Using a theater metaphor, Erving Goffman discusses the importance of “backstage” areas where a person “can relax; he
can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character”
[25, p. 70].
Ferdinand Schoeman adds that privacy protects us from “social overreaching” and gives individuals social freedom by limiting the control that
others have over their lives. It does this, he says, by allowing individuals
to choose their associational ties with various groups. Privacy is what allows
them to reveal different parts of themselves depending on the group and
to keep different spheres of involvement separate. This, in turn, limits the
amount of control that any one group can have over its members [26].
2. Privacy affirms self-ownership and the ability to be a moral agent.—Jeffrey
Reiman identifies privacy as the “social ritual by which we show one another
that we regard each person as the owner of herself, her body, and her
thoughts” [27, p. 205]. Through privacy, he says, society lets the individual
know he or she has the ability and the authority to withdraw from others’
scrutiny, and “those who lose this ability and authority are thereby told
that they don’t belong to themselves; they are specimens belonging to
those who would investigate them” [27, p. 205]. Reiman claims that we
understand only selves that think of themselves as “owning themselves” to
be “moral selves”—selves that accept ownership of and responsibility for
their actions [27, p. 206]. Understood this way, privacy is a fundamental
right that enables people to think of their existence as their own and
“protects the individual’s interest in becoming, being, and remaining a
person” [17, p. 44]. As evidence (though not proof) of the fact that privacy
is essential to the creation and maintenance of selves, Reiman refers to
Goffman’s study “On the Characteristics of Total Institutions,” which says
that such institutions (e.g., prisons) include deprivation of privacy as an
essential ingredient in achieving their goal of mortification of the self [17,
p. 40].
Stanley Benn says the reason we allow people privacy is not to give them
a better chance to be autonomous; rather, autonomous persons are worthy
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of respect and entitled to be unobserved unless there are overriding reasons against it [28, p. 26]. He argues that even “secret watching,” in which
one might say no actual harm is done because the spying is not known by
the watched person, is wrong because “it deliberately deceives a person
about his world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his reasons, his attempts to make a rational choice. One cannot be said to respect a man
as engaged in an enterprise worthy of consideration if one knowingly and
deliberately alters his conditions of actions, concealing the fact from him”
[28, pp. 10–11], and “for anyone to watch without his knowledge is to
show disrespect not only for the privacy that may have been his choice,
but, by implication, for him, as a chooser” [28, p. 11].
Gavison admits that there have always been some autonomous individuals in totalitarian societies, and therefore privacy may not be necessary
for autonomy. But she says the fact that most people require privacy is
enough to justify it as a value, because “we are not all giants, and societies
should enable all, not only the exceptional, to seek moral autonomy” [16,
p. 450]. Charles Fried describes a “most basic” form of complete privacy
in which privacy serves not to protect things we will share only with friends
but to protect certain thoughts from the whole world. Although the sharing
of certain thoughts with a lover or friend, he says, would be a “hostile act,”
the thinking of those thoughts is completely consistent with friendship and
love because “these thoughts, prior to being given expression, are mere
unratified possibilities for action” [29, p. 485]. Only when we express
thoughts do we adopt them and choose to make them part of ourselves,
he says, and this is why privacy is essential to the freedom to define ourselves. Julie Inness also talks about privacy providing a sphere of autonomy
in which a person can develop a self-concept as an originator of love,
liking, and care [30, p. 107].
In their theory of privacy as a fundamental moral right, Alfino and Mayes
contend that a person requires personal space in order to reason about
his/her choices, that reasoning activity is what links rational agency and
moral autonomy, and that to deprive a person of her ability to reason is
to fundamentally interfere with a person’s capacity for self-government.
According to this framework, privacy is “the condition of having secured
one’s personal space, by which we mean the right to exercise our practical
reason without undue interference from others” [18].
3. Privacy prevents intrinsic loss of freedom of choice.—Reiman claims that loss
of privacy may mean an intrinsic loss of freedom, because “privacy is not
just a means of protecting freedom; it is itself constitutive of freedom in
a number of important ways” [27, p. 204]. He explains that if certain things
are not shielded by privacy, people are automatically and directly denied
important choices, not because of a fear of certain consequences but be-
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cause without privacy they would not be choices in the first place. For
example, “for me to be able to decide who touches my body, or who knows
the details of my personal history, those things must not be generally
accessible to others at their discretion” [27, p. 204]. Furthermore, the loss
of privacy sometimes changes an act itself, because some actions have a
different nature when they are observed. For example, criticizing someone
in public is a different act than saying the same thing in private [27, p.
204]. When information about every action is recorded, certain actions
become different. The act of buying gas is no longer simply a purchase;
it is now also the creation of a record of a person’s whereabouts at a
particular time. Applying for life insurance is also the creation of a permanent record about one’s health [31, p. 161].
Edward Bloustein also provides examples that may fall into this category:
“When a newspaper publishes a picture of a newborn deformed child, its
parents are not disturbed about any possible loss of reputation as a result.
They are rather mortified and insulted that the world should be witness
to their private tragedy,” and “when an author does a sympathetic but
intimately detailed sketch of someone, who up to that time had only been
a face in the crowd, the cause for complaint is not loss of reputation but
that a reputation was established at all. The wrong is in replacing personal
anonymity by notoriety, in turning a private life into a public spectacle”
[32, p. 979]. Without privacy, a person is denied a choice about whether
he or she wishes to live a life of celebrity.
4. Privacy allows freedom from self-censorship and anticipatory conformity and
allows people to explore their “rough draft” ideas.—This benefit, the one most
frequently discussed in the literature of librarianship, receives a great deal
of attention in other literatures, as well. Here the panopticon prison serves
as a useful metaphor. A prison designed by Jeremy Bentham but never
built, the panopticon was to have a central tower from which a guard could
watch every cell arranged around the tower. The panopticon was designed
to be a “self-monitoring” system as the inmates came to assume continuous
surveillance or would be continually uncertain about when they were being
watched and would adjust their behavior accordingly. Unlike the old dungeon, whose purpose was punishment, the panopticon was designed to
foster rehabilitation, transformation, and the normalizing of behavior [33,
pp. 22–23].
Gavison says privacy in one’s actions “prevents interference, pressures
to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavorable decisions, and other forms
of hostile reaction” and “functions to promote liberty of action” [16, p.
448]. John Gilliom claims surveillance works as tool to produce compliance
through fear, but that it is also a creative force in that “under its power,
we will almost inevitably succumb to the normalizing process which denies
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us any chance for truly autonomous existence” [34, pp. 130–31]. Edward
Bloustein, Charles Fried, and Jeffrey Reiman also talk about the chilling
effect on speech and action that occurs when people believe they are or
may be under scrutiny and may be subject to punishment or denial of
benefits and opportunities [27, 29, 32]. Gavison notes that privacy affords
individuals the opportunity to express unpopular views first to a group of
like-minded people and that “after a period of germination, such individuals may be more willing to declare their unpopular view in public” [16,
p. 450].
In addition to warning of lost liberty, many of the above writers express
concern about the resulting merger of the individual with the mass and
the diminishment of people as unique, autonomous individuals with human dignity. Reiman speaks of the risk of psychopolitical metamorphosis:
“The risk . . . is not that we shall lose something that we now enjoy but
that we shall become something different than we currently are, something
less noble, less interesting, less worthy of respect” [27, p. 206]. He highlights the widely recognized correlation between privacy and adulthood
and suggests that “the deprivation of privacy stunts maturity and keeps
people suspended in a childish state” [27, p. 207]. Oscar Gandy agrees
that privacy is linked to autonomy, an individual’s freedom to determine
how to respond to options and challenges: “The extent to which an individual conforms to the expectations of others is the extent to which she
or he has given up some autonomy” [33, p. 180]. When it is unclear who
is watching and what their interests or standards are, people will constrain
themselves and avoid questionable or out-of-fashion behaviors. He argues
that individuality is realized through experimental self-discovery, which
requires space free from evaluation and risk.
5. Privacy helps prevent sorting of people into categories that can lead to lost opportunities and deeper inequalities.—Many scholars are concerned that the
gathering of data about individuals and the sorting of people into categories
can lead to lost opportunities, deeper inequalities, destabilized political action, and victimization by error, oversimplification, and decontextualization.
Using the panopticon metaphor, Gandy discusses what he calls the “panoptic
sort,” a “discriminatory process that sorts individuals on the basis of their
estimated value or worth” and “reaches into every aspect of individuals’ lives
in their roles as citizens, employees, and consumers” [33, p. 1]. Gandy claims
the panoptic sort is a defensive technology more concerned with avoiding
risk and loss than with realizing a gain [33, p. 17]. Such sorting has been
facilitated by computer technology that has made it cost-effective to collect,
store, and analyze data, and match it with other data sets.
Gandy is troubled by the fact that those in power use this information
to predict future behavior of an individual not on the basis of the behavior
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of that particular individual but rather on the more general basis of the
past behavior of other individuals in the group or class to which the person
has been assigned based on some attributes [33, p. 144]. Based on this
sorting, individuals will be presented with limited options from which to
choose, leading to an increased knowledge gap between the haves and the
have-nots and a generalized lowering of the average level of public understanding [33, p. 2]. Reiman agrees that the panopticon is a more fitting
metaphor than the fishbowl for this new threat to privacy, because the
modern means of collecting information gathers various publicly observable activities that are dispersed over space and time and makes them
visible from a single point [27, p. 196].
Many writers express concern about the way administrative systems for
collecting data about people must necessarily oversimplify the nature of
individuals and communities. James Scott says “a human community is
surely far too complicated and variable to easily yield its secrets to bureaucratic formulae” [35, p. 23], yet when governments collect standardized records and documents, the information in these records easily becomes the only information to be considered by the state. “An error in
such a document can have far more power—and for far longer—than can
an unreported truth,” he says [35, p. 83].
Social scientist Perri 6 identifies several problems related to this data
collection, aggregation, and sorting. Data-matching algorithms generate
large numbers of both false positives and false negatives, and when used as
a basic tool in decision making, mistakes and misidentification can lead to
specific injustices [36, p. 23]. It also can lead to group injustice, as companies
(especially insurance and retail) use data to make investment decisions and
choose store locations to avoid “down-market” consumers and areas.
As an example, Perri 6 notes the “food deserts” in some inner-city neighborhoods, where no supermarkets are prepared to invest. He argues that
the contemporary information technologies have put an end to the crude
redlining of the 1950s and 1960s, in which banks would not grant mortgages in some areas, and replaced it with more sophisticated ways to size
up a given person and individually tailor interest rates, amounts of coverage, and the premiums that are presented. This “meritocracy” may be
more fair from an actuarial point of view, but Perri 6 questions whether
we want such an unforgiving and rigid meritocracy [36, p. 31]. He observes
that “those who are both articulate and confident in their abilities to correct
mistakes, who can go elsewhere if they are dissatisfied (therefore, those
who mainly use private rather than public services), and who represent
sufficient value to organisations providing these services that it is in those
organisations’ interests to retain their custom, and who have links to others
in their position, are much more likely to frame privacy issues as matters
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of inconvenience” [36, pp. 22–23]. Other people are likely to frame privacy
risks they face in dealing with authorities in terms of “indignity.”
Susanne Lace shares the view that groups that are valuable to companies
may receive special deals while others receive less information and inferior
service, “so even if information does not create inequalities in the first
place, it can reinforce or deepen them” [37, p. 5]. She, too, acknowledges
that this may be “fair” from an actuarial perspective but says society must
weigh the value to society of benefits given to a small group of beneficiaries
against the scale of potential costs falling on others who will not have
access to a range of basic services [38, p. 223].
6. Privacy prevents being misjudged out of context.—Gandy says the panoptic
sort victimizes because it takes information out of context. “Status is divorced from circumstance,” he says, so assessment of individuals will always
be incomplete [33, p. 18]. For example, someone making a hiring decision
and trying to minimize risk might access a worker’s compensation file or
a credit report and see simply that a claim was filed or a payment was late.
They will see no information that assures them the claim was legitimate
or that lateness of payment was justifiable. Gilliom, in discussing the surveillance of welfare recipients, observes that with the advent of computer
systems, caseworkers are unable to account for extenuating circumstances
of their clients and are powerless to change the record-keeping system to
allow for a more complete, accurate picture of the life circumstances of
their clients [34, pp. 97–99].
Richard Wasserstrom finds it troubling that confidential information
supplied for one transaction may be revealed to others for whom the
information was not intended and suggests that information can get distorted and misused through storage, transmission, and drawing of incorrect
inferences [31]. Jeffrey Rosen identifies a related problem that occurs when
individual’s situation changes: “Someone who trades the property rights
in his online purchases to a drugstore when he is healthy would have no
way of recovering his privacy once he is diagnosed with an embarrassing
disease” [39, pp. 181–82]. Solove suggests that in this regard, Franz Kafka’s
The Trial is a better metaphor than George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four
for the problems created by the collection and use of personal data. The
Trial “depicts a bureaucracy with inscrutable purposes that uses people’s
information to make important decisions about them, yet denies the people
the ability to participate in how their information is used” [21, p. 10].
Rosen writes about gossip and suggests that “the privacy of the backstage
protects us from the unfairness of being misjudged by strangers who do
not have time to put our informal speech and conduct into a broader
context” [39, p. 12]. He suggests that the new form of gossip published
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in cyberspace is substantively different from the older form of gossip among
neighbors. Personal information about people published on the Internet
is often exchanged by people who do not know each other or the subject
of the gossip and therefore lacks the restraint that comes with face-to-face
communication [39, p. 189]. Such gossip, he says, is more widely broadcast,
more easily misinterpreted, more permanent, and more difficult to answer
than traditional gossip, because its potential audience is anonymous and
without bounds. It resurrects “all of the stifling intimacy of a traditional
society without the redeeming promise of being judged in context” [39,
p. 205].
7. Privacy provides a physical space in which an individual can control the artifacts
that support the narrative of her/his life.—Iris Young observes that much of
the theoretical discussion of privacy focuses on the cognitive and mental
aspects, emphasizing information, mental states, decisions, and relationships, and failing to notice sufficiently the material bases of privacy [40,
p. 180]. She says that theories of privacy seem to take for granted the
importance of personal space, but for many people, such as the elderly in
nursing homes, private space is not guaranteed. This is a problem, she
says, because in modern societies, an important aspect of the value of
privacy is the ability to have a dwelling space to which one can control
access and live surrounded by records and artifacts that have factual and
expressive meaning and help support the story of one’s life. She claims
that “a dwelling where we reside comes to exist in our image, but we, the
residents, also take on certain of its properties. How we are, our bodily
being, reflects how we reside in built places” [40, p. 172].
8. Privacy preserves the chance to make a fresh start.—Viktor Mayer-Schonberger
[41] and Perri 6 [36] note that the commitment of vast amounts of information to digital memory, along with the end of the need to dispose
of older data for reasons of space, have made it less likely that people and
organizations will forget (and forgive) past behavior. Mayer-Schonberger
says that “with our capacity to remember, we are able to compare, to learn,
and to experience time as change. Equally important is our ability to forget,
to unburden ourselves from the shackles of our past, and to live in the
present” [41, p. 196]. For all of human history, remembering has been
difficult and costly, and humans had to choose deliberately what to remember. Therefore, the default was to forget. In the digital age, however,
the opposite is becoming true, as “committing information to digital memory has become the default, and forgetting the exception” [41, p. 196].
This significant societal shift concerns Mayer-Schonberger because digital memories create a temporal rather than simply a spatial version of the
panopticon and transfer power from the surveilled to the surveyors. Also,
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digital remembering may make it more difficult to accept that humans
change over time, keeps people tied permanently to an increasingly irrelevant past, and undermines society’s ability to forgive its members and
remain open to change [41, p. 197]. Gandy notes that corporations can
dissolve and form anew and wonders why persons should not have the
same right to be forgotten and to make a fresh start by destroying personal
information [33, p. 225]. Wasserstrom also proposes that there is value in
creating a society where certain kinds of derogatory information about
individuals are allowed to disappear after a period of time—where there
is the possibility of change, self-renewal, and a fresh start. He says “a society
that is concerned to encourage persons to believe in the possibility of
genuine individual redemption and that is concerned not to make the
process of redemption unduly onerous or interminable might, therefore,
actively discourage the development of institutions that impose permanent
marks of disapprobation upon any of the individuals in the society” [31,
p. 160].
Benefits to Personal Relationships
9. Privacy allows individuals to be authentic and to play appropriate roles in various
contexts.—Some writers have claimed that personal privacy does a disservice
to society and to individuals. Richard Posner argued that by granting legal
protection to personal information and allowing secrecy, society helps people to conceal “legitimately discrediting or deceiving facts” that should be
revealed, and for this reason, he believes that “from the economic standpoint, private business information should in general be accorded greater
legal protection than personal information” [42, p. 25]. David Brin, in his
book The Transparent Society, says that surveillance is here to stay, and that
rather than resist it, we should focus on making sure that average citizens
as well as the powerful all have access to the tools of surveillance [43].
Wasserstrom says that one reason we do not disclose things is because it
would be embarrassing if certain parties knew. He presents the counterculture theory that people have made themselves more vulnerable than
they need to be by accepting the idea that they ought to feel ashamed or
embarrassed about certain thoughts and actions. This theory suggests that
“when we realize that everyone has fantasies, desires, worries about all sorts
of supposedly terrible, wicked, and shameful things, we ought to see that
they really are not things to be ashamed of at all” because we are not
unique [31, p. 163].
Rosen responds to this view by claiming that those who defend transparency are confusing secrecy with privacy, when secrecy is but one small
dimension of privacy. He says “even those who claim that society would be
better off if people were less embarrassed about discussing their sexual
activities in public still manage to feel annoyed and invaded when they
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are solicited by telemarketers during dinner” [39, p. 210]. Rosen also
observes that defenders of transparency seem to hold a simplistic view of
human personality as unitary and integrated—that people use social masks
to misrepresent the “true” self. He and many others do not accept this.
Schoeman says “roles are not the masks of personality but the very medium
within which personality is attributable to people. Privacy from this perspective supplies the condition for the expression and fulfillment of different dimensions of self, all of which may be equally real” [44, p. 410].
One is being neither schizophrenic nor deceptive when he or she operates
with different values and sensitivities in these various roles. He says these
diverse facets of personality are not inauthentic personae that some true
central self puts forward; rather these selves together are the person, and
that “privacy may provide the contexts in which various facets of personality
can develop” [44, p. 410].
As summarized below, Gavison, Robert Murphy, James Rachels, Rosen,
and Schoeman [16, 39, 44, 45, 46] all discuss the importance of various
roles and the freedom to behave in different ways and share different parts
of the self depending on the context and relationship—whether it be with
a close friend, a student, a family member, or one’s dry cleaner. Schoeman
and Gavison further suggest it is vitally important to some relationships
(e.g., lawyer/client, doctor/patient, teacher/student) that some emotional
distance be maintained through privacy so that objectivity of judgment can
be maintained.
Gavison responds to Posner’s concern that people want privacy in order
to manipulate and cheat by observing that we always give only partial
descriptions of ourselves, and everyone expects that to be the case. The
question is who should do the “editing,” and she asserts it should be the
individual concerned [16, p. 454]. Rachels concurs, arguing that varying
behavior with different people is not accidental; it is in part what defines
different social relationships. This is why privacy is valuable in ordinary
situations in which individuals have nothing to hide: “If we cannot control
who has access to us, sometimes including and sometimes excluding various
people, then we cannot control the patterns of behavior we need to adopt
(this is one reason why privacy is an aspect of liberty) or the kinds of
relations with other people that we will have” [46, p. 331].
When privacy supports a person’s ability to play a role or behave in
different ways depending on context, he or she has more flexibility and
freedom in his or her interactions. To illustrate, Fried says “a reproof
administered out of the hearing of third persons may be an act of kindness,
but if administered in public it becomes cruel and degrading.” Thus, he
notes, “if a man cannot be sure that third persons are not listening—if his
privacy is not secure—he is denied the freedom to do what he regards as
an act of kindness” [29, p. 483]. Murphy explains that “reserve” in the
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playing of a role is essential for interaction. People provide each other
with enough “cues” so that the interaction may continue, but they withhold
sufficient information so that the course of action cannot be fully predicted.
This gives people flexibility in navigating their interactions and, by decreasing the show of emotional attachment to the means and the end of
action, prevents them becoming trapped into commitment [45, p. 1259].
One of the aspects that disturbs Gandy about the “panoptic sort” is that
it gathers data and creates an inflexible profile of a person, denying people
the freedom to make shifts between their operational selves depending on
the context or situation [33, p. 180].
10. Privacy supports intimacy and the building of relationships.—A number of
writers have examined the value of privacy in building and managing intimate relationships. Rosen writes that “in order to flourish, the intimate
relationships on which true knowledge of another person depends need
space as well as time: sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd in which slow
mutual self-disclosure is possible” [39, p. 8]. Relationships shielded by
privacy give people the opportunity to share confidences and test ideas
and intuitions against the responses of those they trust. If they were to fear
that these “rough draft” ideas would be exposed to public scrutiny, they
would be unlikely to share them [39, p. 216]. Taking a different view,
Schoeman observes that when a person shares with others, he or she often
is not supplying them with information that could prove detrimental if
publicly revealed. Rather, he suggests that what makes information private
and intimate is that the information matters deeply to the person revealing
it, and he or she trusts that the person to whom it was revealed will treat
it as important, too [44, p. 406].
Fried claims that respect, love, friendship, and trust require privacy or
the possibility of privacy for their existence [29, p. 484]. According to
Fried, intimacy is the sharing of information selectively, in a context in
which one has the right not to share with everyone or with anyone. It is
privacy that confers this right and creates “the moral capital which we
spend in friendship and love” [29, p. 484] The restraints of privacy apply
among friends, too, enabling people to control degrees of intimacy and
friendship that fall short of love. Monitoring of people is problematic
because it deprives people of the exclusivity of their sharing and makes it
impossible to give the gift of intimacy.
Reiman acknowledges that Fried’s argument is compelling, but he finds
it troubling, too. He questions the notion that intimacy is based on exclusivity and scarcity. Rather, he proposes that it is the context of caring that
makes the sharing of personal information significant, not merely the fact
that information is withheld from others. The revealing of personal information deepens, invites, and nurtures the caring that powers the inti-
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macy. Taking this view, there is no necessary limit to the number of persons
one can be intimate with. What matters is finding people who do not just
want to collect data but who care about each other and want to share
experiences [17].
Inness, too, challenges Fried’s view, observing that if sharing information
were the sole and necessary condition for intimacy, people might have
closer relationships with their doctors or car mechanics than with their
friends. She agrees, however, that Fried provides a promising starting
point—that “intimate information does seem to be somehow constitutive
of close relationships” [30, p. 82]. She proposes that intimacy is linked to
love, liking, and care, and that “privacy is valuable because it acknowledges
our respect for persons as autonomous beings with the capacity to love,
care and like—in other words, persons with the potential to freely develop
close relationships” [30, p. 95].
Schwartz offers an additional perspective, emphasizing the value of privacy and leave-taking within relationships. He claims that periodic withdrawal into privacy is a means of preserving relationships and avoiding
conflict, saying “after a certain point the presence of others becomes irritating and leave taking, which is a mutual agreement to part company,
is no less a binding agent than the ritual of meeting” [23, p. 742].
Benefits to Society
11. Privacy supports the common good.—The communitarian perspective articulated by writers including Amitai Etzioni [47] claims that privacy is an
individual concern that must be balanced against the common good. A
number of writers address this view. Anita Allen argues that privacy concerns are often about the common good [48, pp. 30–31]. As an example,
she says the privacy of individual medical records is good for the public
health if it means people with diseases are more likely to seek help earlier.
She also acknowledges the feminist critique, which equates traditional ideas
of privacy with “barriers to escaping domestic confinement, traditional
roles, and violence” [48, pp. 34–35], but she says this view of privacy is too
limiting. She argues that the longing for personal, quiet time and personal
decision making remains, and she suggests that feminists should not reject
the broad principles that undergird privacy rights but rather work to redraw
the lines between public and private. Beate Rossler offers a similar argument, suggesting that feminists who renounce the separation of private
and public spheres risk losing the necessary sphere of privacy free from
state interference, an aspect that “could protect the home and the family
in a gender-neutral manner” [49, p. 60].
Solove recognizes and affirms the work of other scholars who have noted
that privacy problems extend beyond harms to particular individuals, can
affect the nature of society, and can “impede individual activities that con-
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tribute to the greater social good” [20, p. 488]. He observes that the distinction typically made between individual rights and societal good is somewhat artificial. To illustrate, he says that security is usually thought to be
a societal interest, but it is essential for individual autonomy, too. On the
other hand, a society without privacy protection and some degree of freedom from the intrusiveness of others would be suffocating and likely not
a place in which most would want to live. According to Solove, these
examples show that privacy “is not an external restraint on society but is
in fact an internal dimension of society” [21, p. 15]. Privacy has a social
value, because while it protects the individual, it does so for the sake of
society. Solove also observes that breeches of confidentiality involve violations of trust, not only individual emotional distress, and he claims that
“there is a strong social value in ensuring that promises are kept” [21, p.
21].
Gavison suggests that although individuals today enjoy more privacy in
some areas, it may simply be due to the fact that no one is interested in
them. Should someone become interested, it has become quite easy to
take privacy away. She argues that although most people are unlikely to
experience this, they have an obligation to protect those who do, just as
people should be concerned about the rights of criminal suspects even if
they have not been exposed to police brutality themselves, and regardless
of whether or not they may be exposed in the future. She says that “more
generally, we want to be part of a society that is committed to minimizing
violations of due process” [16, p. 469].
12. Privacy protects from power imbalance between individuals and government/
organizations.—Klaus Lenk claims that privacy issues have been too hastily
stated in purely individualist terms in order to make them more manageable. He observes that “civil rights, freedom of expression, the possibility
of taking part in political discussions free from fear of negative reactions,
are some of the fields where a changed information balance may produce
adverse impacts” [50, p. 288], and he predicts that information technology
will contribute not only to the centralization of social control but also to
its intensification. In his discussion of the centralization of information
management and resources through computers, Lenk says the real issue
at stake is not personal privacy but the power gains of bureaucracies at
the expense of individuals and of the nonorganized sectors of society.
According to Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, new shifts in power—which
are technical, faceless, and individuated—defy the possibility of revolt or
collective resistance [51, p. 188].
Gilliom concurs, observing that “in the media’s rush to quote a privacy
advocate on the latest loss to privacy, we hardly ever hear about what must
be one of the most important issues of all: the ongoing shifts of power
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and domination inherent in the tooling and retooling of surveillance programs” [34, p. 128]. Gilliom, who studied the U.S. welfare system, observes
that the welfare bureaucracy demands complete disclosure from its clients
yet cloaks itself in massive obfuscation so that no one really knows the
rules about how they can and cannot be treated [34, p. 87]. He finds it
telling that the government’s proudest surveillance programs are aimed
at finding fraud rather than in finding hungry children, needy families,
or unmet health need [34, p. 128].
Gandy notes that “the power that the individual is able to exercise over
the organization when she withholds personal information is almost always
insignificant in comparison with the power brought to bear when the
organization chooses to withhold goods or services unless the information
is provided” [33, p. 19]. In this way, individuals are usually “contract term
takers” with little real choice about whether to give personal information,
and people with little economic power have less choice than those with
more. In addition, the transaction costs to the individual of protecting his
or her privacy are very high; it is virtually impossible for the individual to
“negotiate” with the huge number of people/organizations who could
invade his or her privacy. For these reasons, Gandy believes a “free market”
approach to protecting privacy cannot work [33, p. 207]. Furthermore,
individuals cannot imagine all the interests that will have access to their
information nor the many various uses to which their information will be
put. Therefore, the analysts engaged in surveillance operate behind a cloak
of invisibility [33, p. 54].
Gandy calls classification a “technology of control . . . an activity that is
linked intimately with the exercise of power” and observes that “differences
not measured, for all intents and purposes, are differences that do not exist”
[33, pp. 82–83]. In his analysis of modern statecraft and the importance of
information gathering, Scott notes that the state may use the power it gains
from making society “legible” for good or ill. For example, the Nazis used
maps to identify concentrations of Jews in order to deport them; such maps
could also be used for a good purpose, like feeding them [35, p. 78].
Benn acknowledges that the usual arguments against surveillance are based
on the possibility that a tyrannical government or powerful organizations may
use information for blackmail or victimization. But he offers another reason
to be concerned. He says that people resent being watched because it makes
them feel like objects or specimens and not “as subjects with sensibilities, ends,
and aspirations of their own, morally responsible for their own decisions, and
capable, as mere specimens are not, of reciprocal relations with the observer”
[28, p. 6]. Such resentments suggest a possible ground for a prima facie claim
not to be watched in the way one watches a thing or an animal, “for this is
to ‘take liberties,’ to act impudently, to show less than a proper regard for
human dignity” [28, p. 7]. Bloustein expresses a similar idea: “A man whose
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home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversation may be
overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may
be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity,
on that account” [32, pp. 973–74].
Solove also discusses concerns about due process and power imbalances
related to surveillance and data gathering/mining. He emphasizes that
the issue is not whether individuals have something to hide; rather the
issue is about the way people are treated by the government and institutions. Data aggregation also means that government can glean disparate,
innocuous bits of information that individuals do not care to conceal and
combine them to create a profile that people might want to conceal. These
problems, Solove says, are different than those created by surveillance.
They often do not result in inhibition or chilling, but they affect the power
relationship between people and institutions and create a sense of helplessness and powerlessness [21].
13. Privacy supports democracy, political activity, and service.—As discussed earlier, many writers have noted that surveillance and lack of privacy can have
a chilling effect on free speech, free association, and other First Amendments rights that are essential for democracy. Solove notes that the chilling
effect likely affects only a small number of individuals—probably those
engaging in particularly unpopular speech. But he contends that it is valuable to protect against such chilling not simply because of its harm to
those particular individuals. He says chilling effects also harm by reducing
the number and variety of viewpoints expressed and the degree of freedom
people have to engage in political activity [21, p. 17]. For example, even
individuals who had no desire to become outspoken or engaged in the
civil rights movement might agree that it is a good thing for leaders such
as Martin Luther King Jr. to have the ability to speak freely.
14. Privacy provides space in society for disagreement.—Gavison and Rosen describe the value in preserving privacy and private spaces in which people
can conduct activities and hold viewpoints about which there are varying
views or a lack of consensus about the desirability of certain norms and
expectations. Rosen says “privacy protects a space for negotiating legitimately different views of the good life, freeing people from the constant
burden of justifying their differences” [39, p. 24]. To illustrate, he explains
that people’s views about consensual sexual behavior are highly and legitimately varied, and reasonable people can disagree. Privacy means those
views do not have to undergo public scrutiny and people are not forced
to justify their choices.
Similarly, Gavison says privacy relieves tensions between personal preferences and societal norms. She observes that some societal norms for
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behavior are of minimal benefit to society but difficult to change. Privacy
can prevent the destruction of the lives of people condemned by such
norms and thereby contributes to a more tolerant, pluralistic society [16,
p. 455].

Conclusion
This relatively brief dip into the vast sea of literature on privacy has identified scholars in many disciplines who have given consideration to the
meaning and value of privacy, including anthropologists, legal scholars,
philosophers, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. The review
has shown that the term “privacy” is difficult to define and perhaps best
used as an umbrella term to describe a web of related concepts and that
while specific behaviors vary from one society to another, the need for
individual and group privacy is present across cultures.
Scholars in other disciplines share librarians’ concern about the “chilling
effect” on inquiry and expression that results from loss of privacy, and they
identify many other ways that privacy matters to the individual. These ways
include protecting from the overreach of social interaction; affirming selfownership, moral agency, and freedom of choice; preventing victimization
of people through categorization and being misjudged out of context; and
allowing an individual to make a fresh start. Importantly, these scholars
also argue that privacy has value not just for individuals but for the building
and maintaining of relationships and the support of a more just, democratic, and tolerant society. Librarians may find this broader understanding
of the value of privacy to society useful in affirming and defending their
commitment to the privacy of library users, even as individuals may claim
not to care about their own privacy.
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